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Abstract 
This paper provides an economic rationale for the tolerance of some level of illegal immigration 
by many developed countries. Illegal migrants can be easily hired with informal contracts that do 
not respect labour market regulations, such as minimum wage. Informal employment of illegal 
migrants allows increases in production and capital revenues above the levels in which marginal 
labour productivity equals the minimum wage without depressing natives’ wages, protected by 
the regulation. Using a standard general equilibrium model, we show that in presence of 
minimum wage regulations, optimal migration policy may include both legal and illegal 
migrants.   
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The Political Economy of Illegal Migration: 
Minimum Wages and Migrants’ Cheaper Labour 
 
 
“The reality is that if the government were able to stop everybody at the border, there would be 
no agriculture. You wouldn’t be eating asparagus.” 
Walsh (1999)
1
 
“Illegal immigration is a persistent phenomenon in part because it has a strong economic 
rationale.”  
Hanson, (2007: 32)  
“Policies designed to curb international migration benefit employers who hire undocumented 
migrants to avoid complying with existing pay and working conditions regulations.” 
Tacoli and Okali (2001) 
1. Introduction 
In a period of growing globalization and international labour mobility, illegal 
immigration has become a widespread phenomenon, that often covers the first page of several 
newspapers and that is gaining importance in governments’ policy agendas. The collapse of 
communism, economic instability in emerging economies and more recently the Arab 
revolutions have led to new inflows of illegal migrants in many Western countries. Controversial 
feelings are associated with illegal immigration: the convenience of their cheap labour force, 
particularly in low-wage sectors, such as home care or agriculture, is opposed to the perception 
of illegal immigrants as a source of crime and terrorism and as a burden for host countries’ 
welfare system.  
The official position of all governments is that illegal immigration, together with 
organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, is a serious problem that needs to be combated. 
Various tools are used in this respect, from border patrols to sanctions for illegal employment of 
foreigners, from deportations and regularisations to readmission agreements with the source 
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country, and even, as has been observed recently, the granting of temporary visas to new 
migrants, hoping they would leave to other countries in the passport-free Schengen area. Such 
signals of strong commitment to combat illegal immigration may be appealing to the popular 
electorate, particularly during economic downturns at home or political unrest in source 
countries, as can be witnessed by the recent rise of anti-immigrant parties across Europe.  
Despite these official positions, recent estimates suggest that illegal immigration is a 
deeply-rooted and widespread phenomenon. In 2008, the estimated stock of illegal migrants was 
1.200.000 in the United States (32,4% of the foreign population), 650.000 in Italy (22.1% of the 
foreign population), 725.000 in the UK (11.1% of the foreign population), 570.000 in Spain 
(10.9% of the foreign population) and 250.000 in Greece (43,8% of the foreign population).
2
 The 
presence of important numbers of illegal immigrants in many developed countries may have two 
main reasons: either their governments are unable to reduce illegal immigration levels, due to 
institutional or budget constraints, or they are unwilling to do so, for political-economic 
concerns. This paper argues that the second reason is part of the explanation.  
Most illegal migrants participate in the host country’s economy. They represent a 
significant source of labour supply, particularly in low-wage sectors such as agriculture, 
construction, food processing, restoration and home care. These sectors would be severely hurt if 
they were deprived of unauthorised migrants’ labour force. Interest groups in these sectors may 
therefore lobby governments to turn a blind eye on illegal immigration. But if these industries 
need labour supply, why don’t governments increase the level of legal migration? Instead of 
tolerating illegal immigration, governments could simply offer more visas to thousands of Latin 
Americans, East Europeans or North Africans willing to work in a Western country. While part 
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of the explanation may be electoral, as argued by Facchini and Testa (2010), there are also non-
negligible economic considerations. The most important one is related to the existence of 
minimum wage regulations in the host country. When these regulations are binding, i.e. the 
marginal labour productivity has reached the minimum wage, production can only be increased 
by informally employing workers at wages below the regulation. Illegal migrants are then more 
convenient than legal migrants because they are easier to be hired informally.
3
 A secondary 
economic rationale for increasing labour supply with illegal rather than legal immigration is 
related to public finances in the host country. As some illegal immigrants pay taxes, but many 
social welfare benefits are conditional to legally residing in the host country (OECD, 1999), 
illegal immigration may in some cases be more convenient for public finances. We formalize 
these two arguments in a simple theoretical framework.  
This paper is related to the literature on the impact of migration on the host country and 
on the political economy of immigration policies. The seminal paper by Borjas (1995), shows 
that if migrants bring no capital with them, immigration increases total income in the host 
country, but also generates a redistribution of wealth from labour to capital revenues. If migrants 
bring some capital with them, the impact of immigration on total income of natives and on its 
redistribution between labour and capital owners is lower. A number of papers have developed 
political economy models of  immigration policies. Benhabib (1996) analyses how immigration 
policies that impose capital requirements to migrants would be determined under majority 
voting, when natives differ in their capital holdings. Amagashie (2004) models an immigration 
lobbying contest between a firm and a union and shows how the reservation wage of immigrants, 
the cost of lobbying, and the price of the firm’s product affect the permissible number of 
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immigrants. Facchini and Willman (2005) examine policies restricting international factor 
mobility when domestic groups bid for protection and the government maximizes a welfare 
function that depends both on voters’ welfare and on contributions from interest groups. Epstein 
and Nitzan (2006) analyze how lobbying, the weight of total welfare in government’s objective 
function and the possibility for the government to intervene in the policy proposal determine 
migration quotas. All these papers only considered legal migration.  
Another strand of the literature has focused on illegal immigration and has studied 
optimal policies when the government wants to limit the flow of illegal immigrants. The 
pioneering paper of Ethier (1986) analyses the effectiveness of border versus internal 
enforcement in combating illegal immigration. In that model, skilled and unskilled workers are 
used to produce a final good via a neoclassical production function. Illegal immigrants increase 
the supply of unskilled workers. Firms employ unskilled labour up to the point in which the 
wage equals the marginal labour productivity. In absence of wage rigidities, illegal immigration 
reduces the unskilled wage and increases the skilled wage. In presence of wage rigidities, it 
increases unskilled unemployment rate without affecting the skilled workers. Border 
enforcement, modelled as the probability for an illegal entry attempt to fail, determines the 
supply of illegal migrants. Internal enforcement, modelled as the probability for a firm 
employing an illegal worker to be caught and pay a fine, determines the wage gap between 
illegal migrants and unskilled legal workers. The model shows that using a mix of border and 
internal enforcement is less costly than using only one type of enforcement. Bond and Chen 
(1987) extend Ethier’s setting to a two-country context, distinguishing between the cases of 
capital mobility and capital immobility. Woodland and Yoshida (2006) further extend this 
framework and relax the assumption of immigrants’ risk neutrality. They show that non-neutral 
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attitudes to risk may lead to multiple and unstable equilibria. Illegal immigration is reduced by 
tighter border control and greater internal enforcement. The effect of internal enforcement on the 
wage rate of illegal workers depends on their attitude to risk. All these papers on illegal 
immigration rest on the assumption that illegal immigration is always undesired and 
governments are willing to fight it.  
Only recently, some authors have considered that a certain degree of illegal immigration 
may be deliberately tolerated by governments. Hillman and Weiss (1999) explain permissible 
illegal immigration in an endogenous policy model where illegality denies immigrants the 
possibility to freely choose their occupation, making them become sector-specific factors of 
production. In that setting, the median voter opposes immigration under initial conditions with 
no illegal immigrants. However, once a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, the 
median voter supports increases in illegal immigration, opposes amnesty of existing illegals and 
opposes increases in legal migration. Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) examine the correlation 
between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the United States. The authors find that 
border enforcement falls following positive shocks in the sectors that are intensive in the use of 
undocumented labour. They argue that this finding is consistent with a political economy model 
in which the level of border enforcement chosen by the authorities is affected by lobbying by 
different interest groups. Epstein and Heizler(2008) examine the connection between minimum 
wages, enforcement policy and illegal migration. In their framework, illegal migrants are always 
paid their reservation wage, and the relationship between optimal enforcement budget and the 
minimum legal wage depends on the relative strength of workers’ unions and capital owners. 
Fasani (2009) examines the impact of changes in labour demand on the intensity of deportations 
of illegal migrants from Italy. He finds a negative and significant effect of local employment on 
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deportations and argues that this is consistent with a political economy model in which the 
government maximizes a weighted sum of workers’ and firms’ utility, in presence of labour 
market rigidities. Finally, Facchini and Testa (2010) use a political agency framework to show 
how illegal immigration arises endogenously as a strategic choice of elected officials that face a 
trade-off between pleasing the voters and pleasing a pro-immigration lobby. When the policy 
makers have an information advantage over the public on immigration supply, they announce a 
certain immigration quota to please the majority but then they relax the enforcement level in 
order to please the lobby, which leads to illegal immigration.  
Our paper follows this recent line of research, i.e. it provides a political-economic 
rationale for permissive illegal immigration policies. By stressing the link between minimum 
wages and illegal immigration, this paper is closest in line with Epstein and Heizler (2008). 
However, our work differs in several respects. First, we analyse optimal migration policy in  a 
general equilibrium framework with labour and capital markets. Second, in our model the policy 
maker chooses both legal and illegal migration levels. Third, we assume labour markets to be 
competitive, i.e. employers do not have all power for setting illegal migrants’ wages. This 
assumption leads to different model predictions. In particular, in absence of fines for hiring 
illegal workers, in Epstein and Heizler (2008), only illegal migrants would be hired, while in our 
model firms would still hire natives and legal migrants as long as their productivity exceeds the 
minimum wage. Given that employer sanctions are very small in expected terms
4
 and that 
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 Bach and Meissner (1991) warned that “evidence is building that the early effort among employers to comply in 
response to publicity about the new law and wide-ranging INS contacts is dissolving into complacency as employers 
experience the low probability of an actual INS visit.” For instance, government audits of employers to measure 
compliance with employer sanctions were at almost 10,000 in 1990, and less than 2,200 in fiscal year 2003 
(Brownell, 2005). Even if now employers’ sanctions are becoming more stringent, the number of employers actually 
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natives and legal migrants represent the majority of employees in developed countries, we 
believe our assumption of competitive labour markets to be more realistic.  
In our model, informal employment of illegal migrants may be the only way to increase 
production in sectors in which labour productivity is below the minimum wage. In order to focus 
on this simple explanation, we assume away all other differences between legal and illegal 
migrants. We show that introducing this possibility in a standard immigration model à la Borjas 
(1995) is sufficient for rationalizing permissive illegal immigration policies in presence of 
minimum legal wages. Contrarily to Borjas (1995), we show that in this case an immigration 
surplus may arise also when natives’ wage does not fall as a result of immigration. Finally, we 
also consider a redistributive welfare system and analyse the conditions under which illegal 
immigration is more convenient than legal immigration as far as its impact on government’s 
budget balance is concerned.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 2.1 
considers the benchmark case of competitive labour markets. Section 2.2 considers the case of a 
minimum wage regulation. Section 3 presents the welfare system extension and section 4 
concludes. 
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2. The Model 
We consider an economy populated by   native individuals, indexed by  . They are all 
endowed with one unit of labour, but they differ in the amount of capital they own,     , 
where ∑     
 
   .
5 One final good   is produced by competitive firms with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function,         , where   is the quantity of capital and   is the quantity of 
labour used in production. The price of the final good is normalized to one. 
The economy’s labour force is composed of natives, legal migrants and illegal migrants. 
All migrants are endowed with one unit of labour and do not own any capital. We assume that all 
workers have the same productivity.
6
 The number of legal and illegal migrants is determined by 
the economy’s migration policy. While governments do not have perfect control over the number 
of migrants (and in particular of illegal migrants) entering their country, their policies still play a 
major role in determining this number. Visa requirements represent a binding constraint on legal 
migration, as the number of people willing to migrate from developing to developed countries 
highly exceeds the number of available visas (Clemens, 2011). Other examples of such policies 
are working permit requirements, constraints on employers hiring foreigners, and citizenship 
rules. Despite the  lower control governments have over illegal migration, policies such as the 
frequency of border control, workplace inspections, fines, deportations and amnesties, as well as 
the level of social care to which irregular migrants are entitled, shape individuals’ incentives to 
attempt illegal migration and their chances to actively participate in the labour force once they 
arrive. Since our interest here is the choice of optimal migration levels – and not the choice 
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 K can alternatively be interpreted as human capital. With this interpretation, firms use skilled and unskilled labour 
to produce a final good, native workers differ in their skill level and immigrants are all unskilled, as in Ethier (1986).  
6
 Clemens (2011) argues, based on existing empirical literature, that most of the differences in productivity between 
rich and poor countries is due to place-specific factor productivity gaps, and not to differences inherent to workers. 
Allowing for differences in labour productivity would not change our qualitative results. 
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among various migration policies for a given target – we do not explicitly model the policy tools 
used to attain those migration levels (such as visa quotas, border enforcement, internal 
enforcement, etc.), but we simply define migration policy as a couple (   ), where   is the 
number of legal and   the number of illegal migrants participating in the labour force.7 Thus, 
labour supply for a given migration policy (   ) is        , and capital supply is fixed 
and equal to     
While having the same productivity, legal and illegal migrants differ in that illegal 
migrants can be hired with informal working contracts. An informal working contract does not 
need to comply with labour market regulations such as the minimum wage.
8
 Minimum wages, 
determined either by legislation or by collective negotiations, exist in most developed countries 
but they are often not respected for illegal migrants, usually employed off the books. Informal 
employment at wages below the minimum also exists among natives and legal migrants, but it is 
much less frequent than in the case of illegal aliens, since natives are rarely willing to accept 
such poor working conditions, particularly if the wage is below social security benefits, while 
legal migrants often need to show formal employment contracts in order to maintain their legal 
status
9
 . 
We assume labour and capital markets to be competitive, i.e. no individual worker or 
firm has the power to influence the market wage or interest rate.
10
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 Informal contracts also allow employers to avoid paying taxes. Cuff et al. (2011) propose a theoretical analysis of 
optimal policies in presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers. In this paper, employers’ only motivation 
for hiring illegal migrants is the possibility to avoid the minimum wage regulation. 
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 About two-thirds of undocumented workers earn less than twice the minimum wage, compared with only one-third 
of all workers (Passel et al., 2004). 
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Firms choose the profit maximising levels of capital and labour. Their demand for labour 
and capital determines equilibrium wages and interest rate. Firms do not pay any fine for hiring 
illegal workers.
11
 Thus, as long as the minimum wage regulation is not binding, they are 
indifferent between hiring natives, legal migrants and illegal migrants.  
The utility of native   is: 
     
 (   )     
 (   )  
 
 
   [  (   ) ]   (1)  
where   (   ) and   (   ) are respectively the equilibrium wage and the interest rate, and 
 
 
 
   [  (   ) ]   is the non-economic cost of legal and illegal migration, with     and 
     
The non-economic cost of migration represents real or perceived negative effect of 
immigrants on natives, independently of labour and capital markets. These non-economic 
factors, such as fears about the effect of foreigners on national identity, culture and crime rates, 
are important determinants of individuals’ preferred migration levels (Mayda, 2006). Taking into 
account that these feelings are usually stronger towards illegal immigrants, and that illegal 
migrants are less likely to well integrate in the host society due to the fear of being caught and 
deported, we assume that illegal immigrants entail a higher non-economic cost, i.e.    . The 
technical reason for including these costs is that natives’ revenues are convex in migration levels. 
Including sufficiently convex non-economic migration costs allows interior solutions for optimal 
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of papers, starting from Ethier (1986), have analysed the effect of such fines on illegal migrants’ employment and 
wages. Our question here is different. We want to determine the optimal number of legal and illegal migrants in the 
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policy maker has no reason for introducing such fines. 
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migration levels.
12
 For the rest of this paper, we will assume that   is sufficiently important, i.e. 
we assume: 
        (  ⁄ )  (   ).
13
 (2)  
The policymaker maximizes a social welfare function equal to a weighted sum of natives’ utility. 
A simple way of aggregating individual preferences into a social welfare function is to assume 
the capital stock   to be equally distributed among a fraction   of natives, while the other 
fraction,     only have labour endowments. We will refer to these groups as capitalists and 
workers respectively. Thus       ⁄  if native   is a capitalist and      if native   is a 
worker. The policymaker  maximises a welfare function equal to a weighted sum of the two 
groups’ welfare: 
   (   ) 
 (   )   [  (   )  (   ⁄ )  (   )]  
 
 
   [  (   ) ]
 
  
where   is the weight that the government attaches to the welfare of capitalists. This weight may 
depend on government’s own ideological preferences, on its interest in being re-elected and on 
lobbying efforts by each group, which we do not explicitly model.
14
 The share   of capitalists 
may have either a positive or a negative impact on government’s weight  . If government’s 
decisions are highly influenced by electoral concerns, the weight   on the welfare of capitalists 
will be small when their number is low in order to maximise the number of votes. If 
government’s decisions are highly influenced by lobbying,   will be high when the number of 
capitalists is low, since smaller interest groups are more likely to coordinate in lobbying 
activities. We make no particular assumption about the correlation between   and  .  
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function, see Giordani and Ruta (2011). 
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 This assumption ensures that the utility maximization problem admits an interior solution (see proof of 
Proposition 1). 
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 This weight may also depend on the business cycle, as argued by Shughart et al. (1986). 
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Let us analyse the migration policy preferred by native  . First, we determine the 
equilibrium wage and interest rate for a given migration policy (   )   Second, we compute 
native  ’s preferred migration policy (     ). Finally, we determine the migration policy which 
maximises the social welfare function described above.  
In section 2.1 we analyze the benchmark case in which wages and interest rates are 
determined competitively. In section 2.2 we consider the more realistic case in which the labor 
market is constrained by a minimum wage regulation. 
2.1 Migration Policy in Absence of a Minimum Wage Regulation 
We assume in this section that wages and interest rates are determined competitively. In 
this case, natives, legal migrants and illegal migrants are perfect substitutes. Firms hire additional 
workers as long as their productivity exceeds the wage.  In equilibrium, wages and interest rates 
equal the marginal productivity of labour and capital respectively: 
    (   ) (
 
 
)
 
 
(3)  
 
    (
 
 
)
   
 
(4)  
Let us determine native  ’s preferred migration policy (     ). First, it is easy to see that 
       , i.e. native  ’s preferred migration policy implies zero illegal migration, independently 
of his capital stock. From (1), (3) and (4), we can see that to any policy (   ), native   strictly 
prefers the policy (     ), that allows the same total number of migrants, but where all 
migrants are legal. The reason for this is that native  ’s revenues    and    only depend on the 
total number of migrants   , but illegal migrants induce a higher non-economic cost.  
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Second, let us determine native  ’s preferred level of legal migration,   , taking into 
account that     . As migration increases labour supply   and leaves the capital stock 
unchanged, we can see from (3) and (4) that migration decreases labour revenues and increases 
capital revenues. Individual  ’s preferred migration level depends on his capital stock and on the 
non-economic cost of migration, as shown in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: When markets are competitive, native  ’s preferred migration policy is (    ), 
where the level of legal migration      increases with his capital stock    and decreases with 
the non-economic cost of migration  . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
   
Proposition 1 implies that a migration policy with a positive level of illegal immigration 
cannot be optimal, since the utility of all natives could be strictly increased by keeping the total 
number of migrants constant and replacing illegal migrants with legal ones. Therefore the 
government maximises    with respect to  , taking    . Note that the only difference 
between individual  ’s and government’s utility function is the weight given to the interest rate, 
which is    for individual   and   (  )⁄  for the government. Then, following the exact same 
steps as in Proposition 1, we can show that the migration policy maximising the social welfare 
function is a vector (    ), where    is increasing with   and   and decreasing with       and 
 . Thus, when markets are competitive, there is no rationale for allowing a positive level of 
illegal migration, and,  in line with previous literature, the optimal level of legal migration 
depends positively on the weight of capital owners,  , and negatively on the non-economic cost 
of migration,  .  
14 
 
 
 
2.2 Migration Policy in Presence of a Minimum Wage Regulation 
Consider now the more realistic case in which a minimum wage regulation forbids firms 
to hire workers at wages below     . If marginal labour productivity is higher than the 
minimum wage and an additional worker enters the labour market, he will be hired and paid his 
marginal productivity independently of his legality status. If marginal labour productivity is 
equal to, or lower than the minimum wage and an additional worker enters the labour market, he 
will be unemployed if he is a native or a legal migrant, and hired informally, for a wage equal to 
his marginal productivity, if he is an illegal migrant.  
As in the previous section, we first determine the equilibrium wage and interest rate for a 
given migration policy (   ), then we analyse native  ’s preferred migration policy and the 
welfare maximising migration policy. 
Denote by      the quantity of labour such that marginal labour productivity is equal to 
the minimum wage:       ((   )     )
  ⁄ . Note that      decreases with     . As 
marginal labour productivity is decreasing,      is the maximum number of workers that can be 
employed respecting the minimum wage regulation and  (      ) the maximum production 
level obtainable. We assume that the minimum wage regulation is not binding in absence of 
migration, i.e. (   )(   )      , which is equivalent to  
 
<    .
15
 Let us now analyse 
the impact of different migration policies on natives’ welfare. 
A migration policy (   ) such that            implies that all workers can be 
employed formally, as the marginal productivity of the last worker is higher than the minimum 
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wage. In this case, the equilibrium wage and interest rate are the competitive ones, given by (3) 
and (4) and they only depend on the total number of migrants    . As in the previous section, 
the welfare of all natives would be strictly higher with the policy (     ), leading to identical 
revenues but lower non-economic migration costs for the natives. Therefore such a policy cannot 
be optimal unless    . 
A migration policy (   ) such that            implies that not all workers 
present in the country can be employed formally, as the marginal productivity of the last worker 
is lower than the minimum wage. Since only illegal workers can be employed informally, the 
equilibrium production, wage and interest rate depend not only on the total number of migrants 
   , but also on the number of illegal migrants  . Three cases are possible:         , 
         and         .  
Consider first the case         . The marginal productivity of the last worker is 
lower than the minimum wage. As we assumed that legal migrants and natives cannot be paid 
below the minimum wage, only      natives and legal migrants will be employed. It is easy to 
see why such a policy cannot be optimal. Decreasing the number of legal migrants from   to 
       and keeping the number of illegal migrants unchanged would not modify the number 
of workers participating in the labour force, i.e.      workers employed formally and   workers 
employed informally. Wages and interest rates would not be affected,
16
 but unemployment and 
the non-economic cost of migration would be reduced and the utility of all natives would be 
higher.  
Consider second the case         . Then natives, legal migrants and        
  illegal migrants will be employed at the minimum wage, and   (        ) illegal 
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migrants will be employed at their marginal productivity, lower than the minimum wage. Such a 
policy cannot be optimal, since replacing           illegal migrants with legal migrants 
would not change the equilibrium wage and interest rates, but it would reduce the higher non-
economic cost associated with illegal immigration.  
Therefore a migration policy with a positive level of illegal immigration cannot be 
optimal, unless the number of legal migrants is such that marginal labour productivity is equal to 
the minimum wage, i.e.         . Let us now compute natives’ revenues when     
     and    . In this case, firms will hire all natives and legal migrants at the minimum wage, 
and informally hire illegal migrants at their marginal productivity. Denote by   
 ( ) and   ( ) 
the equilibrium wage of illegal migrants and the equilibrium interest rate when the migration 
policy is (        ). The wage   
 ( ) is given by the marginal productivity of the last illegal 
worker, i.e.: 
   
 ( )  (   ) (
 
      
)
 
      
(5)  
The interest rate   ( )  is computed by dividing total capital revenues, equal to total 
production minus total labour remuneration, by the number of units of capital present in the 
economy.
17
 Total production is given by: 
  (        )   
 (      )
   . (6)  
Total labour remuneration is equal to              
 ( )  Thus, total capital remuneration is 
given by: 
     ( )     (      )
                 
 ( ). (7)  
By rearranging the terms and replacing      with its expression, we have: 
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   ( )      [ (
   
    
)
 
 
  ]
  
[ (
   
    
)
 
 
   ]  (   )
 
     
   
   (8)  
Natives’ revenues with a migration policy (        ) are represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Labour and capital revenues for a migration policy (        ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can now compute native  ’s preferred migration policy. Proposition 2 summarises the 
results.  
Proposition 2: When labour markets are constrained by a minimum wage regulation, native  ’s 
preferred migration policy (     ) is such that the level of legal migration    increases with his 
capital stock    up to       , and    is positive if the level of capital    is sufficiently high and 
the cost of illegal immigration   is sufficiently low . 
𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝐼 
 𝐼 
𝐿𝐷 
𝐿 
 
𝐿𝑆 𝑤 
𝑤𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝑤𝐼
 (𝐼) 
𝑁 
𝐴 
𝐵 𝐶 
𝐷 
𝐸 
A: Capital revenues of natives 
B: Labour revenues of natives 
C: Labour revenues of legal migrants 
D: Capital revenues of natives 
E: Labour revenues of illegal migrants 
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 2 shows that in presence of a minimum wage regulation, individuals with 
sufficient capital holdings prefer a positive level of illegal immigration. This allows increases in 
production above  (      ) and in natives’ capital revenues without hurting their wages, 
protected by the minimum wage regulation. Natives’ preferred level of illegal immigration is 
only limited by its non-economic cost. 
Policy maker’s objective function closely resembles the one of native  , except that the 
weight given to the interest rate is (   ⁄ ) instead of   . It follows directly that if the 
government puts a sufficient weight on the welfare of capitalists and if the non-economic cost of 
illegal immigration is not too high, government’s preferred migration policy implies a positive 
level of illegal immigration. 
Our model predicts that all else equal, governments who put a higher weight on capitalists’ 
welfare should tolerate higher levels of illegal migration. However, the same governments 
should also set lower minimum wages, reducing the need for illegal migration. In order to derive 
clear empirical predictions with respect to the correlation between minimum wages and illegal 
migration levels, the minimum wage policy should be endogenized as well.  
This section showed that labour market rigidities provide an economic rationale for allowing 
illegal migrants to participate in the economy. The following section argues that in some cases, 
the existence of redistributive welfare systems provides an additional reason for policy makers to 
favour illegal rather than legal migration.  
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3. Extension 
Consider a redistributive welfare system à la Facchini and Mayda (2009), in which the 
state taxes labour and capital revenues at the same rate   and distributes individual welfare 
benefits  . Assume that legal migrants are entitled to the same welfare benefits as natives, while 
illegal migrants only get a share   [   ] of these benefits. This assumption is consistent with 
the practice of most developed countries, which provide some basic health and education 
services to all residents, irrespectively of their legality status, but limit other welfare transfers, 
such as unemployment benefits or housing subsidies, to legal residents only. We also assume that 
a share   of illegal migrants pay taxes, to account for the fact that illegal migrants do contribute 
to the welfare system to some extent, by paying some direct and indirect taxes.  
In order to focus on the welfare system, we assume in this section that there are no 
rigidities in the labor market. Thus, for a given migration policy (   ), wages and interest rates 
are the competitive ones, given by (3) and (4).  
Government’s budget balance is: 
    [  (   )(      )    (   ) ]   (       ) (9)  
We do not assume that the government’s budget is necessarily balanced, but we do 
assume that the government takes into account the impact of policies on the budget.
18
 Suppose 
the government wants to increase the labour force in order to increase production and profits. In 
absence of minimum wage regulations, legal and illegal migrants are perfect substitutes in the 
labour market. However, their impact on government’s budget balance is not identical. An 
                                                 
18
 This is a more realistic assumption that the balanced budget constraint. We could alternatively consider a situation 
in which the tax rate adjusts for a given level of benefits, or the level of benefits adjust for a given tax rate, in order 
to keep the budget balance constant, as in Facchini and Mayda (2009). We would then compare the impact on tax 
rates (or on benefits for constant tax rates) of increases in legal and in illegal immigration. 
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additional illegal immigrant is more beneficial for the budget balance than an additional legal 
migrant if          ⁄⁄ . One can easily check that is condition is satisfied whenever: 
      (   ) (   ) (   )⁄  (10)  
 
Figure 2 plots the combination of parameters for which (10) is satisfied. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of legal and illegal immigration on public finances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Legal migrants are more profitable to public finances. 
B: Illegal migrants are more profitable to public finances. 
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A marginal increase in illegal immigration is more profitable to public finances than a 
marginal increase in legal migration when the tax rate   is low, when welfare benefits   are high, 
when illegal migrants are entitled to a small share   of the welfare benefits, and when an 
important share   of illegal migrants pay taxes. If the welfare system satisfies these conditions, 
governments who want to increase production through immigration but who are concerned about 
public finances, may opt for increases in illegal rather than legal migration. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper rationalises the tolerance of some level of illegal immigration by many developed 
countries. First, we argue that in presence of binding minimum wage regulations, increases in 
production and capital revenues can only be obtained by informally employing illegal migrants 
at lower wages. When capital owners have a sufficient influence on migration policy choices, 
either through lobbying or for ideological reasons, some level of illegal immigration will be 
purposely tolerated by the authorities. Second, we argue that authorities’ concern for public 
finances may induce them to prefer illegal rather than legal migration when the welfare system 
has some particular features such as low welfare benefits for illegal migrants and sufficient tax 
contributions from the latter. 
Endogenizing the minimum wage is an interesting direction for future work. One would 
analyse the policy mix in which the government protects national workers with a minimum wage 
regulation and pleases capitalists by tolerating employment of foreign workers at lower wages. 
Such a framework would also allow derivation of testable predictions with respect to the sign of 
the correlation between minimum wage law and illegal migration.    
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Appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
We have already shown that for all  ,     . Let us determine   , taking into account that    
 . First, it is straightforward to check that               ( )⁄ , where  ( )  
 (   )      [ (   )]⁄   (   )⁄ . Second, it is easy to check that   ( )     
  ( )     (   )    where  ( )  (   )   [  (   ) ]. As  ( ) is increasing 
in , if  ( )     (   )   then  ( )     (   )   for all . Third, it is easy to show 
that  ( )     (   )          (  ⁄ )  (   )   , which is satisfied by 
assumption (2). Thus,   ( )    for all  . If    is such that     ( )    ⁄ , i.e. individual   
has a lower than average capital stock, then as  ( ) is increasing,     ( ) for all  and thus 
       ⁄  for all . In this case individual  ’s utility function decreases with   so    . If 
    ( )    ⁄ , then as  ( ) is continuous,               ⁄ , where    is given 
by     (  ). From this equality and the expression of  ( ), it is easy to check that an 
increase of    and a decrease of   both imply a higher  .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
We have already shown that the only possible optimal migration policies (   ) are such that 
         and     or         and    .  
First, Proposition 1 implies that natives with sufficient capital holdings prefer the policy 
(        ) to (          ). 
Second, let us show that natives with sufficient capital holdings prefer the policy (         
 ) to (        ). 
When         and    , the utility of native   is given by: 
           
 ( )     [       (   ) ]
 ⁄  
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In the following 4) steps, we will check that this utility function is maximised for a strictly 
positive   when    is sufficiently high and   sufficiently low. 
1) Define the following functions and thresholds:  
(A1)   ( )  (   ) [ (
   
    
)
 
 
  ]
    
 
 (   ) 
   
    
    
(A2)   ( )  [ (
   
    
)
 
 
  ]
    
[ (
   
    
)
 
 
   ]    
(A3)    
 (   )
   
    
[ (
   
    
)
 
 
  ]    
(A4)    
 
   
 (   ) 
   
    
  
2) The functions   ( ) and g( ) satisfy the following properties: 
(A5)   ( )   ; 
(A6)   ( )
   
→    ; 
(A7)   ( )  [ (
   
    
)
 
 
]
    
  ;  
(A8)   ( )
   
→   . 
3) The following equivalences are satisfied: 
(A9)             ( )     ⁄  
(A10)    ( )         ( )     ⁄  
(A11)    ( )              ((   )      )
 
  ⁄ ; 
(A12)   (    ((   )      )
 
 )     
(A8), (A11) and (A12) imply that imply that  ( ) is maximized for when       
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4) Two cases are possible: either  ( )    or  ( )   .  
Case 1:  ( )       (   )   (   )   
  [
   
    
]
    
 
. 
As  ( ) is continuous and    , (A8), (A11) and (A12) imply that      such that  ( )    if 
and only if     . Then (A10) implies that   ( )             ⁄ , so  ( ) is maximised in 
      Two sub cases are then possible: either  (  )    or  (  )   . 
Case 1.1:  (  )   . As  ( ) is maximised in     , this implies that  ( )        
Then (A9) implies        ⁄    , so    is maximised for    . Thus in this case    
 .  
Case 1.2:  (  )   . As  ( ) is continuous and first increasing, then decreasing in  , this 
implies that       ̅ such that  ( )    for all   such that         ̅.Then (A9) implies 
that         ⁄ for all   such that         ̅. In this case the utility function    is first 
decreasing, then increasing, then decreasing again in  . It is maximised either in and 
    or in      ̅.   is maximised in   ̅ if and only if   ( )    (  ̅), which is 
equivalent to   ⁄  (   )  ̅[ (      )  (   )  ̅]    [ 
 (  ̅)   
 ( )] .  
As   ( ) is an increasing function of  , this is conditions satisfied when    is sufficiently 
 high and   sufficiently low. 
Case 2:  ( )       (   )   (   )   
  [
   
    
]
    
 
.  
As  ( ) is maximized for when    , this implies that  ( )    for all  . In this case 
  ( )      ⁄  for all  . Then (A5) implies that  ( )    for all  . As    ,  ( )    for all  . 
Then         ⁄  for all  , so     .  
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To sum up, the utility of native   is maximised for a strictly positive level of illegal 
immigration when    is sufficiently high and   sufficiently low. 
 
